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A Rendezvous with Discretion: An Analysis of Federal 
Simplified Acquisition Procedure Contracts 
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Abstract 
Scholars have long argued about the role of discretion in public administration. For some, 
discretion is a means of applying needed expertise in administration, while others view 
discretion as a departure from democratic priorities. As administration becomes more 
complex, discretion is becoming more important for public managers. This paper assesses 
how federal contracting officials use discretion afforded via simplified acquisition procedures 
(SAP) to influence equity and performance. Findings indicate that when using discretion, 
contracting officials are less likely to select minority-owned and small businesses despite a 
preference for these vendors under SAP. However, SAP contracts are much less likely to 
terminate early than other contracts, indicating that federal contracting officials may use their 
discretion to improve contractor performance. This suggests that when using discretion, 
contracting officials may prioritize efficiency goals over equity concerns. 
Introduction 
Scholars have long debated the role of discretion in public administration. For some, 
bureaucratic organizations are a tool used to implement the policy decisions of 
democratically elected legislators and executives (Finer, 1936; McCubbins, Noll, & 
Weingast, 1987). Those who ascribe to this view hold that granting public administrators 
high levels of discretion can warp or circumvent processes designed to ensure 
accountability through the system of checks and balances established in the U.S. 
Constitution (Moe & Gilmour, 1995). Other scholars have argued that discretion is not only 
inevitable but also desirable, as public administrators possess technical expertise that can 
help solve complex problems and improve the overall efficiency of the system (Bertelli & 
Lynn, 2006; Friedrich, 1935).  
It is also widely acknowledged that the organizational structures used to implement 
public policy are increasingly complex, as single organizations no longer possess the 
resources to solve “wicked” problems on their own (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Churchman, 
1967; O’Toole, 1997). As a result, top-down control of the bureaucracy can be even more 
difficult, as it requires oversight of administrators across multiple levels of government as 
well as contractors, collaborators, grantees, and even citizen groups involved in the 
coproduction of public services (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014; May & Winter, 2009; 
O’Toole & Meier, 2004; Poocharoen & Ting, 2015). However, there is little research on how 
discretion has been used under these complex conditions and what effect administrative 
discretion has had on performance. 
This article assesses how federal contracting officials use their discretion to design 
contracts and whether their use of discretion improves access and contractor performance. 
Contract managers always have some discretion over contract design. Under certain 
circumstances, this discretion is broadened. Simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) reduce 
many of the procurement rules for federal contracts valued at less than $150,000 (Federal 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 2- 
Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2014). Under SAP, federal officials are granted more 
discretion than they have on other contracts. Notably, contract design under SAP requires 
less documentation and reporting to justify decisions and interference from hierarchical 
management is reduced (FAR Part 13). SAP are designed to reduce the costs of 
administering federal contracts while also improving access for disadvantaged firms (FAR 
13.002). Thus, the two primary rationales for SAP are improvements in efficiency and equity. 
To accomplish these goals, the federal government allows great discretion to contracting 
officials, who are freed from guidelines about competition, financial structure, and various 
other components of contract design. Comparing SAP contracts to the other contracts 
allows insight into how discretion is used and whether its use improves equity and efficiency. 
The following section analyzes the literature on discretion and contracting to clearly 
specify the contribution of the present research. The subsequent section provides the 
technical information on simplified acquisition procedure and how they allow contracting 
officials greater discretion. Then, I introduce my hypotheses, data, and analytic methods. 
The following sections present my results and discuss their meaning in the context of 
discretion and public values of efficiency and equity. I conclude with remarks about 
implications for practitioners and scholars.  
Discretion and Contracting 
Discretion has been defined in terms of both bureaucratic politics and individual-level 
decision-making. Scholars of bureaucratic politics have tended to focus on the macro-level 
autonomy afforded to public agencies during policy implementation (Gruber, 1987; Riley, 
1987). Other scholars have studied the ways that administrators at the street level can 
influence policies and programs through decision-making based on individual expertise 
(Hupe, 2007; Lipsky, 1980). This study focuses on discretion in the context of micro-level 
decision-making.  
Street-level bureaucrats operate in complex environments that reduce external 
control and require quick and influential decision-making at the point where government 
interacts with citizens (Lipsky, 1969). Contracting officials are the interface through which 
the government engages the private marketplace for goods and services. In this role, 
contracting officials generally control decisions related to setting requirements, establishing 
the period of performance, selecting the solicitation procedures, determining the payment 
structure and payment schedule, evaluating the contractor’s performance, responding to 
emergencies and performance problems, and providing performance incentives (Curry, 
2010). Thus, contracting officials wield micro-level discretion over many of the most 
important decisions that affect the relationship between government and its vendors. How 
they choose to wield this discretion is likely to affect outcomes, as it does in other areas of 
street-level bureaucracy such as social services, education, and law enforcement (Atkins, 
2013; Cooper, 1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Riccucci, 2005; Wilkins, 2008). 
Contracting is also an area where there is persistent concern over the potential for 
corruption and lack of accountability (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008; Curry, 2010). In the case of 
government contracting, discretion may make this perception worse, as it can make the 
system seem unpredictable to potential contractors, political overseers, and the general 
public (Girth, 2014). Citizens and policy-makers expect contracting officials to tailor contract 
requirements to the contextual demands of the good or service needed, while also applying 
consistent evaluation and management criteria when assessing bids and monitoring 
contractor performance. There is evidence that, when discretion is high, administrators may 
be more likely to follow legal procedures to justify their actions should a conflict arise 
(Bardach & Kagan, 1982). However, others assert that properly disciplining contractors 
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requires the targeted use of technically informed administrative discretion (Kelman, 1990). 
Thus, contracting officials are expected to use their discretion to both hold contractors 
accountable and navigate the legal and political environment. Yet little work has been done 
that directly addresses the role of discretion in government contracting. 
Clearly, more research is necessary in this area. When afforded the opportunity to 
use discretion, how do public contracting officials use it? How does the use of discretion 
influence what kinds of contractors are selected? And does discretion influence contractor 
performance? This research seeks to fill these gaps. Before these questions can be 
answered, it is necessary to provide some background in federal simplified acquisition 
procedures, which grant federal contracting officials wider discretion than they have when 
managing other contracts. 
Federal Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
Simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) give managers the discretion to choose 
design elements more freely for contracts valued at less than the simplified acquisition 
threshold (FAR 2.101). The SAP threshold is currently $150,000 for most goods and 
services but can be as high as $7 million for contracts that, based on the expectations of the 
contracting officer, will exclusively involve the purchase of commercial items (FAR 2.101, 
FAR 13.500). Federal contract managers who use SAP are able to apply professional 
expertise to design contracts based on the circumstances and contract requirements. 
According to FAR 13.002, SAP are designed to: 
• Lower administrative costs associated with contract administration 
• Improve access to government contracts for disadvantaged businesses 
• Increase the efficiency of the contracting process for smaller contracts 
For federal contracting officials, SAP remove many procurement regulations, 
allowing greater managerial discretion in an effort to reduce administrative costs. While the 
procedures still explicitly state a preference for competitive bidding (FAR 13.104), federal 
officials are granted the freedom to use a single source if they perceive that source to be the 
best “reasonably available” (FAR 13.106-1[2][b]). Sole source justifications under SAP are 
much shorter and require less oversight from superiors (FAR 13.106-1[2][b]). This reduces 
the administrative burden associated with justifying the use of sole source contracts. SAP 
also allow federal officials to use standing price quotations, wherein companies make fixed 
bids for the provision of particular types of goods and services which are broadly available to 
contracting officials across government. Using standing price quotations eliminates the need 
to fully solicit bids for each SAP contract, lowering costs for both the contractor and the 
agency (FAR 13.103). Finally, SAP free federal contracting officials to evaluate bids based 
on the official’s discretion (FAR 13.106-2[b]). While they still must review all bids, they are 
not forced to evaluate them using the somewhat rigid procedures prescribed for the review 
of sealed bids or negotiated proposals. Many steps, such as formal evaluation plans, 
competitive ranges, and quotation scoring are not necessary if factors other than price are 
important for source selection (FAR 13.106-2[b][3]). By removing these requirements, the 
contracting official can tailor the evaluation criteria and procedures to the purpose of 
contract, including the desired timeline of the procurement. Taken together, these 
procedures allow federal contracting officials much greater discretion in contract design and 
management in an effort to improve the efficiency of contracting initiatives.  
To increase equity, SAP establish priority for disadvantaged businesses, including 
those that qualify as 8(a), historically underutilized business zone (HUBZone), service-
disabled veteran–owned, and woman-owned small businesses (FAR 13.003[b]). By the law, 
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any acquisitions for goods or services valued between $3,000 and $150,000 are to be 
reserved for such disadvantaged businesses (FAR 13.003[b][1]). Through this preference, 
SAP are designed to allow greater access for disadvantaged firms. However, the decision 
not to use one of these sources is not subject for review (FAR 13.003[b][3]), leaving 
contracting officials with great discretion over the selection of disadvantaged vendors. This 
presents an excellent opportunity to study whether contracting officials actually use their 
discretion to promote access and equity, or whether they instead focus on other values.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Though contracting officials always have control over important contracting decisions 
and wield discretion that can influence contract outcomes (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 
2006; Cooper, 1980), SAP create a subset of contracts where reliance on technical 
expertise is much greater. This analysis investigates how this discretion is used and whether 
it influences contractor performance.  
Before investigating the impact of discretion, it is necessary to examine how federal 
contracting officials use SAP to design contracts. Administrative discretion through SAP is 
only important if public managers choose to use it. There is evidence that government is 
engaging in contracts without making workforce changes necessary to ensure adequate 
personnel and expertise for effective contract management (Brown et al., 2006; Milward & 
Provan, 2000). As a result, contracting officials may be overburdened and undertrained 
(Cohen & Eimicke, 2008). In such circumstances, it might be reasonable to expect that 
contracting officials might be unable to actually use much discretion, instead opting to follow 
standard operating procedures regarding contract design. Or, contract managers might 
design contracts that place the burden of performance on the contractor, reducing the need 
for active oversight (Girth, 2014, 2017). 
Contract design refers to the administrative steps taken to specify the work to be 
performed, reduce risk to the government, and ensure the selection of the best vendor 
(Shetterly, 2000). This analysis focuses on two facets of contract design: competitive 
sourcing and the financial structure (or type of contract). Competitive sourcing relies on the 
market to set the most efficient price for the good or service desired (Weimer & Vining, 
2005). Competition also promises a ready supply of substitute vendors should the selected 
vendor fail to perform. Thus, competition can reduce the burden on contracting officials, as 
the market should naturally provide low prices, limit the need for strict oversight, and even 
spur innovation as contractors seek to gain short-term advantages over one another. SAP 
have an expressed preference for competitive sourcing, and it is likely that contracting 
officials have incentives to use this approach when possible to both reduce their own 
workload and boost performance. 
H1a: Contracts using SAP will be more likely to use competitive sourcing than 
other contracts. 
Financial structures can be used to allocate risk among parties to a contract. Fixed-
price financial structures shift performance risk to the contractor, as the contractor must 
work to complete to work as far below the fixed-price ceiling as possible to maximize profit. 
Cost-reimbursement and time-and-materials contracts incentivize contractors to continue to 
charge to the contract to maximize profits. These types of contracts also require contracting 
officials to conduct ongoing reviews of receipts to monitor performance (Shenson, 1990). 
Overburdened federal contracting officials may, when given discretion, attempt to use it to 
reduce their workload and shift risk to contractors by selecting fixed-price contracts.  
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H1b: Contracts using SAP will be more likely to use fixed-price payment 
structures than other contracts. 
Evidence suggests that public managers use discretion, particularly bargaining and 
collaboration, in ways that are consistent with organizational goals and contextual 
considerations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). One of the primary goals of SAP is to increase 
access to government contracts for disadvantaged businesses (FAR 13.002). Previous 
studies have shown that public managers use discretion to increase representation in 
government (Sowa & Selden, 2003). There is also evidence that contract managers promote 
representativeness when selecting contractors, as agencies with more minorities are more 
likely to select minority-owned contractors (Fernandez et al., 2013; Smith & Fernandez, 
2010). Since the FAR specifically reserves SAP contracts for disadvantaged groups, these 
types of organizations should be more heavily represented, though it may depend on the 
product or service area. 
H2a: Contracts using SAP are more likely to be with minority-owned 
businesses than other types of contracts 
H2b: Contracts using SAP are more likely to be with woman-owned 
businesses than other types of contracts 
H2c: Contracts using SAP are more likely to be with veteran-owned 
businesses than other types of contracts 
H2d: Contracts using SAP are more likely to be with all disadvantaged 
businesses than other types of contracts 
Public administrators are hired for their technical expertise. Contracting officers are 
experts in the management of public procurement, though they are often constrained by 
procurement regulations (Kelman, 1990; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). Removing constraints 
reduces transaction costs for both contractors and the government, allowing for a greater 
focus on efficiency (Brown & Potoski, 2003). When freed to make their own decisions about 
contract design, including competition, source selection, and performance evaluation, there 
is some evidence that overall performance in the procurement of complex products can 
improve (Kelman, 1990). Though ethical concerns may arise (Finer, 1936; Moe, 1987), SAP 
procedures have built-in mechanisms designed to limit corruption and maximize 
transparency, thus preserving accountability (FAR 13.104). As a result, simplified acquisition 
procedures, which remove many procurement regulations for both government officials and 
contractors, can be expected to result in higher performing contracts. 
H3: Contracts using SAP are less likely to terminate early than other types of 
contracts 
Data and Methods 
The data for this analysis comes from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next 
Generation (FPDS–NG). This database, created in 2004, captures information on all 
unclassified federal contracts. I examine federal definitive contracts—standalone contracts 
for complex products and services. My sample consists of the 24,396 complex definitive 
contracts that ended between 2005 and 2014. Of these, 4,195 (17.20%) used SAP. SAP are 
used on a range of contracts. In this sample of definitive contracts, the work performed 
tends to be fairly complex, as simpler work tends to use purchase orders or indefinite 
delivery vehicles for procurement. The most common types of work performed on SAP 
contracts in these data were research, data processing and telecommunications services, 
management support services, and physical construction and site maintenance. These are 
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complex contracts that require contracting officials to apply expertise for effective 
management. In this study, I compare this subset of contracts where managers are granted 
a greater degree of discretion to traditional contracts, which are subject to all federal 
procurement regulations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
used in this analysis. 
The first part of my analysis investigates how public managers use the discretion that 
is afforded to them. The FAR prefers the use of competitive, fixed-price contracts. However, 
these two measures (competitiveness and financial structure) do not correlate well enough 
to create a unified scale measuring contract design diversity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.11). As a 
result, I treat each decision separately. Doing so requires ordering the preferences within 
the FAR about competitive sourcing and financial structure. In the case of competitiveness, 
full and open competition is desired. When full competition is not possible, the FAR allows 
for certain exclusions. Only in extreme cases (emergency, unique expertise, high levels of 
uncertainty about requirements, etc.) should contracts not be competitively sourced. 
Similarly, fixed-price contracts are preferred because they shift financial risk to the 
contractor. However, they are sometimes not possible as requirements are uncertain, 
necessitating the use of cost-reimbursement contracts. Time-and-materials contracts, which 
incentivize longer durations and cost overruns, are least preferred. The result is a pair of 
ordered preference categories for both the competitiveness of the solicitation and the 
financial structure of contracts (shown in Table 2). 
I hypothesize that, even though they are given discretion through SAP, public 
officials are likely to choose contract design elements that are consistent with the guidelines 
of SAP and leverage market forces to improve price efficiency and shift risk to contractors. 
Fixed-price contracts and market competition have the convenient benefits of lowering 
contracting officials’ workloads while also providing professional cover should performance 
problems occur. To analyze this, I use two multinomial logistic regression models1 to 
determine the probability of SAP contracts using the various competitive sourcing 
procedures and financial payment structures: 
Model 1: Pr | Competitive Sourcing Procedures = α + Discretion + Complexity 
of Good/Service + Agency Characteristics + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
Model 2: Pr | Contract Financial Structures = α + Discretion + Complexity of 
Good/Service + Agency Characteristics + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
The primary explanatory variable, discretion, is a dichotomous indicator of SAP 




1 An ordered logit model might be appropriate because the variables of interest (indicators of the 
ordinal preference of contract competitiveness and financial structure) are categorical with exclusive, 
ordered categories. However, Brant tests indicate that the parallel regression assumption is violated 
in both models. These assumptions are also not met in generalized ordered logit models, which relax 
the parallel regression assumption somewhat (Brant, 1990; Williams, 2006). Since the parallel 
regression assumption is violated in both ordered models, multinomial logit models are appropriate as 
replacement estimators (Williams, 2006). Hausman tests indicate that the assumption of the 
independent alternatives is not violated (Hausman & McFadden, 1984). 
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agency characteristics, market characteristics, and the relative importance of the contract for 
the agency and contractor. Complexity of the good or service is operationalized as a 
dichotomous measure of the type of contract being delivered (good or service) as well as 
dummy variables for construction, research, training, information technology, and 
professional services contracts. Agency characteristics included in these models are 
dichotomous indicators of agency type (cabinet department, distributive, redistributive, 
regulatory, and constituent services), the professional staff ratio, agency size (measured by 
size of budget and number of employees), and age in years. The contract’s importance to 
the agency is measured as the total contract value as a percentage of the agency budget 
and of the contractor’s annual revenue. Finally, market characteristics are operationalized 
as the number of bids received and dichotomous indicators for procurements during 
recession years, the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and contracts written in response to 
emergencies. These models test whether SAP lead to greater diversity of contract design 
structures, controlling for institutional and process factors. 
Hypotheses 2a–2d hold that SAP contracts are more likely to use disadvantaged 
businesses, as the program is designed to set aside these contracts for such firms. To test 
these hypotheses, I use four logistic regression models, which are shown below. Each 
model uses a dichotomous indicator of the type of contractor as the dependent variable. The 
explanatory variable in each is a dichotomous indicator of whether the contract used SAP. I 
employ the same control variables as in the previous models. The models test whether SAP 
contracts are more likely to use disadvantaged contractors. 
Model 3: Pr | Selecting a Minority-Owned Contractor = α + Discretion + 
Complexity of Good/Service + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
Model 4: Pr | Selecting a Woman-Owned Contractor = α + Discretion + 
Complexity of Good/Service + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
Model 5: Pr | Selecting a Veteran-Owned Contractor = α + Discretion + 
Complexity of Good/Service + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
Model 6: Pr | Selecting any Small, Disadvantaged Contractor = α + Discretion 
+ Complexity of Good/Service + Importance of Contract + Market 
Characteristics + e 
Finally, I hypothesize that SAP contracts will perform better due to the amount of 
discretion given to contracting officials to establish design elements and select vendors. 
Previous measures of performance have compared the cost of contracting with government 
service provision (Savas, 1977; Savas, 2002) or relied on surveys and interviews for 
performance information (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Romzek & Johnston, 2005). However, 
cost comparisons tell us little about performance, focusing instead on inputs. Surveys and 
interviews have well documented problems, particularly around the reliability of individuals’ 
ability to accurately assess their own performance and the performance of those to whom 
they are professionally tied (Julnes, 2001; Poister, 1999). Here, I introduce a new measure 
of performance based on how contracting officials document the completion of contracts.  
Contracts generally end in closeout or termination. Closeout signifies, at bare 
minimum, acceptable performance. Closeouts account for more than 90% of all contract 
completions. Within this group, there is likely some variation in performance. Thus, I have 
further segmented this category into high- and low-performing closeouts. High-performing 
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closeouts are classified as those where the federal government never de-obligated funds 
from the contractor. Continued payments show ongoing acceptability of the contractor’s 
work throughout the period of performance. Low-performing closeouts are those where the 
government de-obligated more than 50% of the total contract value. Taking money back 
indicates that the government has justified recouping some of its investment due to potential 
performance problems. Termination signals performance problems. The federal government 
terminates contracts for convenience, default, and cause. Terminations for convenience are 
used to end contracts without assigning blame to the contractor, though in many cases 
officials use this type of termination to avoid lawsuits (Cibinic, 2006). Terminations for 
default and cause are used to end poorly performing contracts for commercial and non-
commercial goods and services, respectively. The online appendix to this article provides 
more details on this variable of interest and these outcome categories. 
This variable has a few important benefits. First, it is an outcome measure that 
captures whether the government found the work acceptable or not. Second, it is an official 
record of the documented performance on the contract that was made by a knowledgeable 
contracting official at the moment where they knew the most about the contractor and their 
performance. Third, it allows comparison across multiple types of products and services. A 
termination means the same thing, from a performance perspective, whether the contract 
was for office supplies or consulting services. As a result, this variable is an improvement of 
other variables that allows us to not only investigate a broader sample of contracts, but also 
allows us to measure outcomes instead of just inputs or perceptions of performance. To test 
my performance hypothesis, I use a multinomial logistic regression model to determine 
whether SAP contracts are more or less likely to terminate early than other types of 
contracts. The regression model is expressed below:  
Model 8: Pr | Contractor Performance = α + SAP + Contract Requirements + 
Procurement Conditions + Department Characteristics + Vendor 
Characteristics + e 
A multinomial model is appropriate because the variable of interest (performance) is 
categorical with exclusive categories (closeout, termination for convenience, termination for 
cause, and termination for default) that are unordered. The variable of interest is contractor 
performance, as indicated by the final reason for modification documented in FPDS–NG. α 
is the intercept. The primary explanatory variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the 
contract used simplified acquisition procedures. This dummy variable is an indicator of the 
presence of bureaucratic discretion. The model also includes 45 control variables that 
account for the complexity of the contract, agency characteristics, conditions during the 
procurement, and the strength of the market.2 As with the controls in the previous models, 
these are meant to control for internal and external conditions that might affect each 
contract. 
Findings 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 display the results of my regression analyses. Table 3 presents 




2 Additional information on these control variables can be found in the attached reviewer appendix, 
including sources and justifications for all 45 variables, as well as descriptive statistics. 
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the results of logit models assessing the effect of SAP on equity programs related to H2a, 
H2b, H2c, and H2d. Table 5 presents the results of my analysis of contractor performance, 
pertinent to H4. To facilitate the interpretation of regression results, Tables 3 and 5 display 
relative risks, while Table 4 presents odds ratios. 
SAP contracts are more likely to be competitively sourced and to use fixed-price 
payment structures. As Table 3 indicates, SAP contracts are much less likely to use other 
types of payment structures and competitive sourcing procedures. SAP contracts are half as 
likely as non-SAP contracts to be sole sourced and half as likely to use exclusionary 
procedures. Similarly, when using discretion, managers are half as likely to choose 
time/labor contracts and are extremely unlikely (one-tenth) to use cost-reimbursement 
structures. When using discretion, federal contract managers seem to rely on market 
mechanisms to promote price efficiency and to shift financial risk to contractors. As a result, 
I find strong support for both H1a and H1b. As expected, contract work complexity seems to 
be related to the more frequent use of less-preferred contract design elements. This makes 
sense, as with rising complexity, markets may become weaker and the clear requirements 
may become more difficult (Brown et al., 2013; Curry, 2010; Shenson, 1990). Contracts for 
services (particularly complex services where markets may be less competitive like IT, 
research, and professional services) and contracts by agencies with more professional 
workforces (like NASA or the Department of Energy) are consistently more likely to use less-
preferred contract designs such as sole sourcing and cost reimbursement. Contracting 
officials clearly use their discretion to respond to work requirements and market conditions.  
Table 4 presents results related to equity goals. Despite the fact that the express 
purpose of SAP is to allow greater access for disadvantaged businesses, my analyses show 
that the program is actually less likely to select minority-owned and small business 
contractors. In addition, there is no significant relationship between SAP and contracting out 
to veteran-owned businesses. Woman-owned businesses are 25% more likely to be 
selected as contractors under SAP, the only disadvantaged group to experience any benefit 
from the program. These findings are disappointing, as SAP are specifically designed to 
improve access for such firms to increase their chances for growth and sustained success. 
The SAP program does not seem to be meeting its equity goals. Thus, there is no support 
for Hypotheses 2a, 2c, and 2d. While there is support for Hypothesis 2b, the practical effect 
is fairly small, as woman-owned business are only 25% more likely (or 1.25 times as likely) 
to receive contracts through SAP.  
Table 5 presents the results related to contractor performance. Findings indicate that 
SAP contracts are less likely to be terminated early than other contracts. Specifically, SAP 
contracts are 20% less likely to terminate for convenience and 30% less likely to terminate 
for both default and cause. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Federal contracting officials 
seem to be able to use their discretion to reduce the likelihood of contract termination and 
thus increase the likelihood of acceptable performance. However, SAP contracts are also 
23% more likely to end in low-performing closeout, with the government having to take back 
more than half of the dedicated resources, and nearly 20% less likely to end without taking 
back any funds. This suggests that while SAP may reduce the likelihood of extremely poor 
performance, the use of discretion alone may not encourage particularly good performance. 
In summary, the present analyses indicate that federal contracting officials use their 
discretion to mainly design fixed-price, competitive contracts that shift risk and managerial 
burdens to contractors. Other types of contracts are comparatively rare, but are used 
appropriately on contracts for more complex goods and services. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are 
supported. However, SAP equity goals are not met, as disadvantaged businesses tend to be 
less likely to win contracts using the procedures. Woman-owned firms are the exception, as 
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they are slightly more likely to be selected under SAP. Hypotheses 2a, 2c, and 2d are not 
supported, though Hypothesis 2b is. Finally, SAP contracts are less likely to be terminated 
early, suggesting that federal contracting officers are able to use their authority to improve 
contractor performance. Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Discussion 
There is a longstanding debate over the role of discretion in public administration. 
Discretion can be used to apply technical expertise to problems that are beyond the 
knowledge and control of legislators (Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Vaughn & Otenyo, 2007). 
However, it also has the potential to weaken accountability in ways that could threaten the 
American democratic system of popular agenda setting and institutional checks and 
balances (Finer, 1936; Gruber, 1987; McCubbins et al., 1987). Previous studies of the use 
of discretion in contracting have suggested that its application could improve efficiency by 
reducing transaction costs associated with procurement regulations and by affording 
experienced managers the chance to influence contract design and management more 
effectively (Kelman, 1990; Girth, 2014). My results indicate that efforts to free contract 
managers from red tape have had mixed effects on efficiency and equity. 
Girth (2014) found that, when given the chance to wield discretion, public contract 
managers were less likely to use officially documented sanctions to influence performance. 
Instead, they were more likely to bargain or use informal methods of communication to 
attempt to improve the contract. Indeed, many of the contracting officials interviewed stated 
that, given discretion over a contract, they were more likely to simply trust the contractor to 
get the work done effectively. These public managers were highlighting a tendency to shift 
the burden of contract management from the government to the contractor. My findings are 
consistent with this interpretation. Other recent studies have shown that federal contracting 
officials tend to be overburdened (Copeland, 2011). As a result, it is not surprising that, 
given the chance, contract administrators attempt to design contracts that leverage market 
benefits while reducing their own workload. As in Girth’s (2014) study, I find that contracting 
officials are largely content to place their trust in the markets and in their contractors when 
they are given discretion. My findings augment Girth’s perceptual measures with a 
comprehensive analysis of a large sample of complex contracts. 
SAP are designed to improve the efficiency of contracting. SAP reduce transaction 
costs associated with transparency, information exchange, and accountability for both the 
government and the contractor. As a result, contracts should be less costly and ultimately 
more efficient. However, cost is just one way to measure efficiency. My measure, contractor 
performance, assesses what the government receives for their investment instead of just 
looking at the initial investment. In this instance, performance serves as an indicator of 
efficiency. Terminations are costly and inefficient—costs ignored by traditional measures of 
efficiency focused on initial investment. My results show that SAP contracts are significantly 
and substantially less likely to terminate early than other types of contracts. This indicates 
that federal managers are able to use their discretion to design and oversee contracts more 
efficiently. 
My findings are consistent with much of the existing literature in public administration 
that demonstrates that public managers can improve programs and associated outputs in 
education, law enforcement, social work, and human capital management (Lipsky, 1969; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Riccucci, 2005). In each of 
these studies, the authors argue that administrative discretion can be used to increase 
public value, an argument that runs counter to much of the literature on bureaucratic control, 
which adopts a normative perspective that administrative discretion is anathema to a 
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democratic system of governance (Finer, 1941; Riley, 1987). The pro-discretion argument 
springs from conceptualizations of neutral competence and internal accountability that have 
long been central to public management (Friedrich, 1935; Kaufman, 1956). Public 
administrators are hired primarily for their technical expertise in a particular area 
(Christensen, Goerdel, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Wilson, 1887). This expertise qualifies 
them to make decisions that influence public policy. Historically, political influences on policy 
have resulted in efforts to try to separate administrators from politics to ensure that 
competent decisions are made based on technical expertise instead of passing political 
fancy (Kaufman, 1956). Instead of relying on external mechanisms alone to hold 
administrators accountable, professional standards, training, and internal motivation serve to 
ensure responsible behaviors (Friedrich, 1935). The application of neutrally competent 
expertise can be thought of as a way to ensure that public values are preserved, particularly 
those related to efficiency and effectiveness, values which legislatures often struggle to 
achieve (Battaglini & Coate, 2005).  
My analysis indicates that federal contract managers can improve the performance 
of federal contractors, thus increasing the efficiency of federal procurement. When freed 
from rules designed to ensure accountability and limit ethical violations, such as posting 
solicitation announcements to the central government procurement portal, contracting 
officers design and implement contracts that are between 20% and 30% less likely to 
terminate. This reduces costs associated with both termination and the management of bad 
contracts (GAO, 2008). My findings indicate that contracting officials have the technical 
expertise and training to positively influence federal contractor performance and increase 
the efficiency of federal procurement efforts. 
However, there is also a cost associated with granting discretion. SAP have a dual 
goal of increasing efficiency and equity. My analysis shows that, despite a specific mandate 
to provide set-asides for small, disadvantaged businesses, SAP contracts are less likely to 
be awarded to these kinds of contractors. In particular, minority-owned businesses, veteran-
owned businesses, and SBA-identified small businesses all receive fewer contracts under 
SAP. There are some specific kinds of contracts where other types of disadvantaged 
businesses see benefits, particularly IT and construction. This makes sense, as minority-
owned firms are uncommon in particular industries (Bates, 1989; Lowrey, 2007). But on the 
whole, disadvantaged businesses are not seeing huge benefits from SAP. Even woman-
owned businesses, which experience a slight advantage from the program, are not 
experiencing large effects. Taken together, the implication is clear: contract managers are 
using SAP to accomplish efficiency goals, not equity goals. 
Conclusion 
My analysis establishes that federal contracting officials use their discretion to 
influence contract design and management. SAP contracts are more likely to use design 
mechanisms that leverage market forces and reduce oversight demands. Despite purported 
equity goals, SAP contracts are less likely to go to most types of disadvantaged businesses. 
However, contract managers are able to effectively use their discretion to reduce 
terminations, thus improving the efficiency of federal procurement. These findings are 
consistent with other analyses of discretion in public management. Discretion can be used 
to increase performance but may also have unexpected consequences. In this case, 
efficiency seems to be improved while equity initiatives are weakened. 
It is worth noting two shortcomings of this analysis. First, one concern often 
associated with administrative discretion is that it can increase the likelihood of fraud or 
other ethical violations. FPDS–NG does not include any information on fraudulent behavior, 
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making it impossible to assess whether SAP contracts are associated with problems of this 
type. Additional data would be needed to conduct such an analysis. 
Second, I do not include measures of regional or local-level market variation. It is 
well documented that disadvantaged firms are more common in certain industries (Bates, 
1989; Lowrey, 2007). Couple these trends with regional variations in the overall 
representation of various disadvantaged groups, and it is evident that the present national-
level analysis may gloss over important differences between markets. This is an area where 
additional research could help clarify how to encourage growth of particular kinds of firms 
based on a more detailed assessment of regional or local conditions.  
In a system designed to ensure accountability, this research has mixed implications 
for practice. The U.S. system is often criticized for being slow moving, with change only 
occurring incrementally (Lindblom, 1959). As a result, getting things done can be very 
difficult. Contracts are a tool that is increasingly used to get things done more quickly and 
efficiently (Kelman, 1990; Salamon, 2002). For this purpose, SAP seem to deliver admirably, 
increasing competitive sourcing, reducing the need for constant oversight, shifting risk to 
contractors, and reducing the likelihood of early termination. However, the program is not 
increasing access to government contracts for disadvantaged businesses. While this may 
be due to weaknesses in markets for complex goods and services, the result is the same: 
at-risk firms are not winning nearly as many contracts as they do under regular procurement 
conditions, despite having express preference in SAP. Equity goals are not being met. 
Additional action may be required to both ensure the development of small businesses 
capable of providing these services and to encourage federal contracting officials to use 
such businesses when they are available. 
This study is an effort to compare a large number of contracts with varying purposes 
and originating agencies. As such, it has greater explanatory power than many previous 
studies on contracting. However, it is also very difficult to account for all of the variables in 
contracting. Despite including a thorough list of control variables to account for the context 
of each contract, omitted variable bias is always possible. In addition, this work is 
exploratory. While many of the findings are interesting, more detailed research needs to be 
conducted to explain some of the findings. Three immediate follow-on studies are evident. 
First, this analysis is limited to more complex contracts from within those eligible for SAP. 
SAP are more commonly used for simple procurement, such as purchase orders and task 
orders. These other types of contracts could use more disadvantaged contractors, making 
up for their relative scarcity here. Second, additional research could more carefully classify 
the strength of disadvantaged firms in particular markets. Having a clearer understanding of 
what kinds of goods and services these firms are providing could help explain why equity 
goals are not being met and perhaps provide insight into how to better manage these 
markets. Finally, SAP are just one way that contracting officials use discretion. Contracting 
officials have discretion throughout the contracting cycle. Future research could look at how 
contracting officials justify using this discretion and the impact that it has on contractor 
selection and performance. For example, contracting officials must write justifications for 
sole-source acquisitions. Analyzing these justifications could provide insight into how 
discretion is used to influence competition and ultimately performance. 
This study indicates that federal contracting officials use their discretion in ways that 
influence contract design, equity, and efficiency. This is some initial evidence that discretion 
matters for the management of public contracts. Consistent with existing literature on 
discretion, public contract managers can influence public values through the application of 
their technical expertise. Contractor performance improves under SAP, suggesting that 
contracting officials retain administrative responsibility despite fewer external mechanisms to 
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ensure accountability. Though efficiency seems to be the preeminent value for SAP, its 
equity implications deserve further attention from both scholars and practitioners. 
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Variables of Interest, Models 2–8 
Variable Model 0 1 Mean 
SAP all 20,201 4,195 17.20 
Minority-Owned 3 18,763 5,633 23.09 
Woman-Owned 4 20,987 3,409 13.97 
Veteran-Owned 5 22,060 2,336 9.58 
Small Business 6 17,615 6,781 27.80 
Contracting Officer 
SBA 
6a 7,834 16,562 67.89 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Occurrences of Ordinal Preference of 
Competition and Financial Structure  
(Models 1 and 2) 
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Full and Open Competition 
Reference Category: 
Firm-Fixed Price Contracts 
Not Competed Exclusion Time/Labor Cost 
RR (z) RR (z) RR (z) RR (z) 
SAP Explanatory 0.43 (-19.73)*** 0.53 (-12.86)*** 0.51 (-9.06)*** 0.12 (-13.78)*** 
Service Complexity 2.11 (12.19)*** 1.76 (8.28)*** 3.13 (6.27)*** 1.63 (2.78)** 
Professional Services Complexity 1.74 (10.85)*** 0.68 (-5.87)*** 9.61 (26.03)*** 6.09 (18.17)*** 
Research Complexity 0.59 (-8.58)*** 1.08 (1.23) 2.20 (6.83)*** 7.57 (20.06)*** 
Training Complexity 1.13 (0.88) 0.59 (-2.52)* 1.37 (1.16) 3.15 (4.71)*** 
IT Complexity 2.72 (11.74)*** 0.95 (-0.44) 5.94 (15.75)*** 2.36 (5.46)*** 
Construction Complexity 0.78 (-5.25)*** 0.88 (-2.50)* 0.14 (-10.14)*** 0.20 (-8.38)*** 
Cabinet Department Agency 0.72 (-4.99)*** 0.47 (-9.11)*** 8.19 (14.97)*** 4.79 (13.44)*** 
Distributive Agency 0.38 (-22.63)*** 1.31 (4.40)*** 0.38 (-15.57)*** 1.17 (2.17)* 
Redistributive Agency 3.14 (16.80)*** 1.61 (5.61)*** 1.26 (2.42)* 0.32 (-8.45)*** 
Regulatory Agency 2.08 (15.65)*** 1.53 (6.61)*** 0.88 (-1.85) 0.19 (-21.51)*** 
Constituent Services Agency 1.15 (2.69)** 0.82 (3.12)** 1.05 (0.65) 1.21 (1.95) 
Professional Staff Ratio Agency 2.57 (6.52)*** 1.06 (0.31) 4.80 (7.28)*** 12.86 (9.87)*** 
Age Agency 0.99 (-13.82)*** 0.99 (-0.90) 1.00 (3.86)*** 1.00 (0.39) 
Size (ln) Agency 1.12 (5.64)*** 1.23 (7.79)*** 0.90 (-3.60)*** 1.16 (4.25)*** 
Budget ($ mns) Agency 1.00 (6.36)*** 1.00 (3.01)** 0.99 (-6.53)*** 0.99 (-2.37)* 
Pct. Agency Budget Importance 0.99 (-2.46)** 0.97 (-2.76)** -0.99 (-0.10) 1.00 (2.86)** 
Pct. Firm Revenue Importance 0.99 (-3.50)*** 1.01 (4.08)*** 1.03 (8.32)*** 1.03 (7.81)*** 
Bids Received Market 0.99 (-4.21) 0.99 (-3.35) 0.98 (-8.82)*** 0.99 (-5.15)*** 
Fourth Quarter Market 1.13 (3.91)*** 0.92 (-2.14)* 1.07 (1.40) 1.21 (3.61)*** 
Recession Market 1.26 (6.06)*** 1.67 (11.81)*** 1.54 (7.51)*** 0.66 (-5.55)*** 
Emergency Market 1.52 (2.15)* 0.54 (-2.19)* 1.24 (0.40) 0.44 (-0.81) 
Constant  0.21 (-6.84)*** 0.04 (-10.89)*** 0.01 (11.53)*** 0.00 (-14.69)*** 
 Ps. R2 = 0.16 Ps. R2 = 0.34 
n = 24,396 * = p < 0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
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CO Sm. Business 
OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) 
SAP Explanatory 0.81 (-4.47)*** 1.27 (4.80)*** 0.98 (-0.36) 0.79 (-5.32)*** 1.50 (9.67)*** 
Service Complexity 1.24 (3.25)** 1.24 (2.72)** 1.30 (3.91)*** 1.03 (0.44) 0.84 (-3.31)*** 
Professional 
Services 
Complexity 1.20 (3.08)** 1.46 (6.07)*** 0.81 (-2.88)** 1.29 (4.85)*** 1.37 (6.44)*** 
Research Complexity 0.83 (-2.86)** 0.99 (-0.05) 0.44 (-8.26)*** 0.69 (-5.50)*** 1.17 (2.92)** 
Training Complexity 0.80 (-1.38) 2.61 (6.60)*** 0.65 (-1.76) 1.01 (0.05) 0.94 (-0.49) 
IT Complexity 2.66 (12.77)*** 1.43 (3.79)*** 1.26 (2.18)* 2.81 (13.57)*** 1.81 (7.51)*** 
Construction Complexity 2.01 (14.40)*** 1.20 (3.16)** 1.09 (1.39) 3.36 (26.32)*** 4.30 (28.48)*** 
Cabinet 
Department 
Agency 0.47 (-11.37)*** 0.43 (-10.35)*** 0.54 (-6.05)*** 0.40 (-13.44)*** 0.28 (-19.65)*** 
Distributive Agency 0.75 (-6.17)*** 1.01 (0.16) 0.83 (2.76)** 0.99 (-0.24) 1.04 (0.92) 
Redistributive Agency 2.07 (11.03)*** 1.07 (0.80) 1.16 (1.48) 1.56 (6.86)*** 1.06 (0.79) 
Regulatory Agency 0.94 (-1.23) 0.97 (-0.60) 1.05 (0.61) 0.99 (-0.30) 1.28 (5.65)*** 
Constituent 
Services 
Agency 0.99 (-0.01) 0.52 (-10.07)*** 0.89 (-1.35) 0.73 (-6.16)*** 0.37 (-19.77)*** 
Professional 
Staff Ratio 
Agency 0.32 (-7.64)*** 0.15 (-10.58)*** 2.12 (3.39)*** 0.11 (-14.48)*** 0.09 (-18.06)*** 
Age Agency 0.99 (-8.66)*** 0.99 (-1.69) 0.99 (-1.09) 0.99 (-9.07)*** 1.00 (3.12)** 
Size (ln) Agency 1.09 (4.09)*** 1.03 (1.33) 1.48 (11.65)*** 1.07 (3.36)*** 1.18 (9.09)*** 
Budget  
($ mns) 
Agency 1.00 (4.31)*** 1.00 (3.36)*** 1.00 (1.45) 1.00 (2.71)** 0.99 (-2.50)** 
Pct. Agency 
Budget 
Importance 0.99 (-1.85) 0.99 (-1.09) 0.99 (-0.63) 0.99 (-2.21)* 1.00 (-3.82)*** 
Pct. Company 
Revenue 
Importance 0.98 (-5.66)*** 0.99 (-2.83)** 1.00 (0.86) 0.97 (10.65)*** 0.99 (-0.73) 
Bids Received Market 0.99 (-4.20)*** 0.99 (-1.86) 0.99 (-0.39) 0.99 (-4.18)*** 1.00 (6.64)*** 











CO Sm. Business 
OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) 
Recession Market 1.26 (6.14)*** 0.97 (-0.68) 1.20 (3.47)*** 1.23 (5.54)*** 1.17 (4.23)*** 
Emergency Market 0.66 (-1.77) 0.77 (-0.93) 0.48 (-2.09)* 0.58 (-2.53)* 0.70 (-1.75) 
Constant  0.27 (-5.66)*** 0.30 (-4.51)*** 0.00 (-16.66)*** 0.56 (-2.53)* 1.56 (2.08)* 
 Ps. R2 = 0.07 Ps. R2 = 0.02 Ps. R2 = 0.04 Ps. R2 = 0.11 Ps. R2 = 0.12 
n = 24,396 * = p < 0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
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Table 5. Effect of Discretion on Contractor Performance Reference Category: Normal Closeout 
Variable 






RR (z) RR (z) RR (z) RR (z) RR (z) 
SAP Contracts 1.23 (2.87)** 0.83 (-4.04)*** 0.78 (-3.71)*** 0.69 (-2.65)** 0.71 (2.27)* 
Experience 0.85 (2.54)* 1.07 (1.90) 0.76 (-5.45)*** 0.82 (-2.56)** 0.50 (-2.54)* 
Service 2.27 (6.33 *** 0.97 (-0.43) 0.99 (0.05) 0.45 (-4.68)*** 0.88 (-0.25) 
Professional Services 1.29 (2.89)** 0.64 (-7.45)*** 0.86 (-1.98)* 0.59 (-2.93)** 0.88 (-0.28) 
Information Technology 0.44 (-4.46)*** 0.66 (-4.57)*** 0.35 (-6.18)*** 0.12 (-2.96)** 1.02 (0.02) 
Training 0.88 (-0.48) 0.86 (-0.92) 0.94 (-0.26) 0.00 (-82.80)*** 0.00 (-22.58)*** 
Research 0.49 (-5.19)*** 1.09 (1.35) 0.50 (5.63)*** 0.36 (-3.25)** 0.30 (-1.26) 
Construction 0.63 (-4.36)*** 1.24 (4.07)*** 0.67 (-4.66)*** 0.94 (0.33) 0.25 (-2.08)* 
Number of Bids 1.00 (1.32) 1.00 (4.16)*** 0.99 (-1.21) 0.99 (-1.36) 0.99 (-0.46) 
One Bid Only 1.49 (5.24)*** 0.91 (-2.21)* 0.67 (-6.82)*** 0.50 (-4.96)*** 0.29 (-2.78)** 
More than 5 Bids 1.32 (2.62)** 0.97 (-0.70) 1.29 (3.76)*** 1.81 (4.15)*** 3.05 (3.42)*** 
Fourth Quarter 0.88 (-2.13)* 0.95 (-1.58) 0.98 (-0.33) 1.02 (0.22) 1.34 (0.98) 
NPO 0.80 (-1.61) 0.86 (-2.01)* 0.78 (-1.99)* 0.12 (-2.12)* 0.00 (-49.55)*** 
Small Business 0.54 (-5.74)*** 0.79 (-4.66)*** 0.98 (0.22) 0.50 (-3.80)*** 0.84 (-0.31) 
Woman-Owned 1.12 (1.30) 1.04 (0.85) 0.89 (-1.47) 1.12 (0.64) 0.74 (-0.53) 
Minority-Owned 1.07 (0.65) 1.14 (2.75)** 1.13 (1.52) 2.03 (3.90)*** 3.87 (2.73)** 
Veteran-Owned 0.99 (-0.09) 1.12 (2.00)* 1.66 (6.70)*** 3.85 (11.07)*** 4.26 (4.28)*** 
Length (months) 1.00 (3.33)*** 0.99 (-6.55)*** 0.99 (0.85) 1.00 (1.52) 0.99 (-0.01) 
10 or More Modifications 1.64 (2.59)** 0.57 (-6.57)*** 0.57 (-3.01)** 0.52 (-2.39)*** 0.50 (-0.58) 
Additional Work (outside 
scope) 
0.67 (-2.97)** 1.83 (3.20)** 0.83 (-2.66)** 0.63 (-2.55)*** 1.08 (0.31) 
Supplemental 
Agreement 
0.69 (-8.11)*** 1.53 (3.82)*** 0.89 (-2.27)* 0.97 (-1.04) 0.70 (-0.97) 
Change Orders 0.80 (-3.62)*** 1.00 (-0.10) 1.24 (2.64)** 1.22 (2.65)*** 0.89 (-0.55) 
Positive Funding Actions 0.48 (-8.35)*** 1.02 (2.30)* 0.98 (-1.07) 0.99 (-0.11)  0.98 (-0.37) 
Negative Funding 
Actions 
1.36 (3.96)*** 0.63 (-4.73)*** 1.24 (4.73)*** 1.15 (1.35) 1.03 (0.08) 
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CO Sm. Business 
OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) 
SAP Explanatory 0.81 (-4.47)*** 1.27 (4.80)*** 0.98 (-0.36) 0.79 (-5.32)*** 1.50 (9.67)*** 
Service Complexity 1.24 (3.25)** 1.24 (2.72)** 1.30 (3.91)*** 1.03 (0.44) 0.84 (-3.31)*** 
Professional Services Complexity 1.20 (3.08)** 1.46 (6.07)*** 0.81 (-2.88)** 1.29 (4.85)*** 1.37 (6.44)*** 
Research Complexity 0.83 (-2.86)** 0.99 (-0.05) 0.44 (-8.26)*** 0.69 (-5.50)*** 1.17 (2.92)** 
Training Complexity 0.80 (-1.38) 2.61 (6.60)*** 0.65 (-1.76) 1.01 (0.05) 0.94 (-0.49) 
IT Complexity 2.66 (12.77)*** 1.43 (3.79)*** 1.26 (2.18)* 2.81 (13.57)*** 1.81 (7.51)*** 
Construction Complexity 2.01 (14.40)*** 1.20 (3.16)** 1.09 (1.39) 3.36 (26.32)*** 4.30 (28.48)*** 
Cabinet Department Agency 0.47 (-11.37)*** 0.43 (-10.35)*** 0.54 (-6.05)*** 0.40 (-13.44)*** 0.28 (-19.65)*** 
Distributive Agency 0.75 (-6.17)*** 1.01 (0.16) 0.83 (2.76)** 0.99 (-0.24) 1.04 (0.92) 
Redistributive Agency 2.07 (11.03)*** 1.07 (0.80) 1.16 (1.48) 1.56 (6.86)*** 1.06 (0.79) 
Regulatory Agency 0.94 (-1.23) 0.97 (-0.60) 1.05 (0.61) 0.99 (-0.30) 1.28 (5.65)*** 
Constituent Services Agency 0.99 (-0.01) 0.52 (-10.07)*** 0.89 (-1.35) 0.73 (-6.16)*** 0.37 (-19.77)*** 
Professional Staff 
Ratio 
Agency 0.32 (-7.64)*** 0.15 (-10.58)*** 2.12 (3.39)*** 0.11 (-14.48)*** 0.09 (-18.06)*** 
Age Agency 0.99 (-8.66)*** 0.99 (-1.69) 0.99 (-1.09) 0.99 (-9.07)*** 1.00 (3.12)** 
Size (ln) Agency 1.09 (4.09)*** 1.03 (1.33) 1.48 (11.65)*** 1.07 (3.36)*** 1.18 (9.09)*** 
Budget  
($ mns) 
Agency 1.00 (4.31)*** 1.00 (3.36)*** 1.00 (1.45) 1.00 (2.71)** 0.99 (-2.50)** 
Pct. Agency Budget Importance 0.99 (-1.85) 0.99 (-1.09) 0.99 (-0.63) 0.99 (-2.21)* 1.00 (-3.82)*** 
Pct. Company 
Revenue 
Importance 0.98 (-5.66)*** 0.99 (-2.83)** 1.00 (0.86) 0.97 (10.65)*** 0.99 (-0.73) 
Bids Received Market 0.99 (-4.20)*** 0.99 (-1.86) 0.99 (-0.39) 0.99 (-4.18)*** 1.00 (6.64)*** 











CO Sm. Business 
OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) OR (z) 
Recession Market 1.26 (6.14)*** 0.97 (-0.68) 1.20 (3.47)*** 1.23 (5.54)*** 1.17 (4.23)*** 
Emergency Market 0.66 (-1.77) 0.77 (-0.93) 0.48 (-2.09)* 0.58 (-2.53)* 0.70 (-1.75) 
Constant  0.27 (-5.66)*** 0.30 (-4.51)*** 0.00 (-16.66)*** 0.56 (-2.53)* 1.56 (2.08)* 
 Ps. R2 = 0.07 Ps. R2 = 0.02 Ps. R2 = 0.04 Ps. R2 = 0.11 Ps. R2 = 0.12 
n = 24,396 * = p < 0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
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